In this paper, we construct an undecidable three-variable superintuitionistic propositional calculus, i.e., a finitely axiomatizable extension of the intuitionistic propositional calculus with axioms containing only 3 variables. We also show that no a two-variable propositional calculus can derive all intuitionistic tautologies. Particulary, there is no an undecidable superintuitionistic propositional calculus using axioms in 2 variables.
Introduction
Decidability is the most important property of propositional calculi, it means that the set of their derivable formulas (or theorems) can be effectively determined. A natural question is how to separate classes of decidable and undecidable calculi. On the other hand, since undecidable propositional calculi can be used as a base for obtaining "negative" solutions to various algorithmic problems, it is of interest to find the simplest possible calculi of that class. There are many possible ways to separate decidable and undecidable calculi. A significant and simplest way is to describe the number of variables in their axioms.
In 1949, Linial and Post [10] found a first undecidable propositional calculus. In 1975, Hughes and Singletary [9] proved that there is undecidable propositional calculi with axioms containing 3 variables. In 1976, Hughes [8] constructed an undecidable implicational propositional calculus using axioms in 2 variables. The final solution was found by Gladstone in 1979 . In [7] he proved that every one-variable propositional calculus is decidable.
A first undecidable superintuitionistic propositional calculus was built in 1978 by Shehtman [14, 15] . Axioms of this calculus are containing 7 variables. Later Chagrov in 1994 [4] did the same using axioms in only 4 variables. In [5, Sections 16.9] he noted that for 2 and 3 variables this question is open.
In [6] Gladstone proved that the following formula is not derivable from the set of all two-variable tautologies by modus ponens and substitution. Since A is the intuitionistic tautology, therefore no a two-variable propositional calculus can derive all intuitionistic tautologies. If we combine this with the Gladstone result for onevariable propositional calculi, we get that there is no an undecidable superintuitionistic propositional calculus with axioms containing less than 3 variables. The aim of this paper is to construct an undecidable three-variable superintuitionistic propositional calculus. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the basic terminology and notation. In Section 3 we state and prove our main result. Finally, in Section 4 we give some concluding remarks and discuss further researches.
Definitions
In this section, we recall definitions of the intuitionistic propositional calculus and Kripke semantics. For more details we refer the reader to [5] .
First, we introduce some notation. Let us consider the language consisting of an infinite set of propositional variables V, brackets, and the signature Σ = {⊥, ∧, ∨, →}, where ⊥ is the constant symbol, ∧, ∨ and → are binary connectives. Letters p, q, r, x, y, etc., are used to denote propositional variables. We define ¬, ↔ and ⊤ as the usual abbreviations:
Propositional formulas or Σ-formulas are built up from the signature Σ, propositional variables from V, and brackets in the usual way. For example, the following notations
are formulas. Capital letters A, B, C, etc., are used to denote propositional formulas. Throughout the paper, we will omit the outermost parentheses in formulas and parentheses assuming the customary priority of connectives: we assume ¬ to connect formulas more strongly than ∧ and ∨, which in turn are stronger than →.
By a propositional calculus or a Σ-calculus we mean a finite set P of Σ-formulas referred to as axioms together with two rules of inference: 1) modus ponens A, A → B ⊢ B,
where σA is the substitution instance of A, i.e., the result of applying the substitution σ to the formula A.
Denote by [P ] the set of derivable (or provable) formulas of a calculus P . A derivation in P is defined from the axioms and the rules of inference in the usual way. The statement that a formula A is derivable from P is denoted by P ⊢ A.
Let us introduce the following pre-order relation on the set of all propositional calculus. We write P 1 ≤ P 2 (or, equivalently, P 2 ≥ P 1 ) if each derivable formula of P 1 is also derivable from P 2 , i.e., if [P 1 ] ⊆ [P 2 ]. We write P 1 ∼ P 2 and say that two calculi P 1 and P 2 are equivalent if [P 1 ] = [P 2 ]. Finally, we write
An intuitionistic Kripke frame is a pair F = W, R consisting of a nonempty set W and a partial order R on W , which is reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric, i.e., F is just a partially ordered set. The elements of W are called the points (or worlds) of the frame F, and the relation R is called the accessibility relation. If for some w, w ′ ∈ W the relation wRw ′ holds, we say that w ′ is accessible from w or w sees w ′ . We write w ≤ R w ′ (or w ′ ≥ R w) iff wRw ′ . A valuation in an intuitionistic frame F = W, R is a map V associating with each propositional variable p ∈ V some (possibly empty) subset V(p) of W such that, for every w ∈ V(p) and every w ′ ∈ W , w ≤ R w ′ implies w ′ ∈ V(p). An intuitionistic Kripke model is a pair M = F, V , where F is an intuitionistic frame and V is a valuation in F.
Let M = F, V be an intuitionistic Kripke model and w be a point in the frame F = W, R . By induction on the construction of a formula A we define a relation (M, w) |= A, which is read as A is true at w in M:
From the definition it follows that
If (M, w) |= A does not hold, i.e., (M, w) |= A, we say that A is refuted at the point w in M.
We say that A is true in a model M = F, V defined on a frame F = W, R if (M, w) |= A for all w ∈ W ; if A is true in M, we write M |= A. We say that A is true in a frame F = W, R if A is true in every model based on F; if A is true in F, we write F |= A. We say that A is true at the point w in frame F if (M, w) |= A for every model M defined on F; if A is true at the point w in frame F, we write (F, w) |= A. If M is fixed we write w |= A instead of (M, w) |= A.
We define the intuitionistic propositional calculus Int as the following set of axioms:
It is well known that
Int ⊢ A ⇐⇒ F |= A, for every Kripke frame F.
By a superintuitionistic propositional calculus we mean a finitely axiomatizable extension of Int, i.e., a propositional calculus obtained from Int by adding a finite set of new axioms. If M is a finite set of propositional formulas, then a propositional calculus obtained from Int by adding new axioms M is denoted by Int + M. Let us call a propositional formulas
we can assume that a superintuitionistic propositional calculus is a calculus Int + A for some superintuitionistic propositional formula A.
Main result
Our main result is the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. There is a three-variable superintuitionistic propositional formula A such that Int + A is undecidable. 
Minsky machine
There are many algorithmic formalisms to prove the undecidability of a propositional calculus [3] . For example, the undecidability of a calculus contained in the classical [1] , intuitionistic [2] propositional calculi or in another subcalculi [3] can be easily proved by using tag systems. But for calculi, which contain the intuitionistic propositional calculus, this is very hard [12, 16] . For this reason, in order to prove the undecidability of superintuitionistic propositional calculi we will use an algorithmic formalism which is called Minsky machines [11] . In [5] Chagrov mentioned that it is the most convenient for being simulated by modal and intuitionistic formulas.
In accordance with [5] we define a Minsky machine as a finite set of instructions for transforming triples s, m, n of natural numbers, called configurations, where s is the number of the instruction to be executed at the next step (referred to as the current machine state), and m, n ∈ N 1 . Each instruction has one of the following four forms:
where s, t, u are the machine states. Note that all Minsky machines are assumed to be deterministic, i.e., they may not contain distinct instructions with the same numbers.
As an example, let us consider the applying of first two instructions. The instruction
transforms s, m, n into t, m + 1, n , and the instruction [11] ). There exist a Minsky machine M and a configuration s, m, n for which the configuration problem is undecidable.
Let M be a Minsky machine and s 0 , m 0 , n 0 a configuration for which the configuration problem is undecidable.
Encoding of configurations
Let p, q and r be three distinct propositional variables. Now we define some propositional formulas using only three variables p, q, r, which encode configurations of Minsky machines. Note that some basic ideas of defining these formulas was found in [5] and [13] .
First, let us define the following groups of propositional formulas constructed from variables p, q and r.
Group (C):
Groups (A 0 ) and (B 0 ):
Groups (A 1 ) and (B 1 ):
Group (E):
Denote by (A) and (B) the following sets of formulas:
and by M the set of formulas:
Kripke model refuting codes of derivable configurations
In this section, we construct a Kripke model M = F, V refuting all formulas from M, i.e., for every formula from M, there exists an unique maximal point, at which this formula is refuted. First, let us define the following equivalence relation ∼ M on the set of all configurations { s, m, n | s, m, n ≥ 0}:
Denote by [s, m, n] the equivalence class of a configuration s, m, n :
The set of all equivalence classes of relation ∼ M is denoted by E M .
Let us define the relation M =⇒ on the set of equivalence classes E M :
Greek letters α, β, γ, etc., are used to denote equivalence classes. Denote by α 0 the equivalence class of the initial configuration s 0 , m 0 , n 0 , i.e., α 0 = [s 0 , m 0 , n 0 ]. Now we define a Kripke frame F = W, R as follows. Let . . . . . .
. . . To define the accessibility relation R on W , we consider the following groups of relations: We take as R the reflexive and transitive closure of R ′ . Let us define a valuation V of the Kripke model M = F, V in the following way:
The model M is depicted on Figure 1 . Now we prove some basic semantic properties of the Kripke model M. 
, then there exist a points w ′ ≥ R w and w ′′ ≥ R w such that w ′ |= x j and w ′′ |= ¬x j . By definition of the valuation V, we have w The proof is trivial by definition of the accessibility relation R.
Key formulas
In this section, we consider the key formulas depending on variables p, q, r. First, let us define the following formulas
Now we introduce the following key formulas:
Note that the formulas F m k and G m k are depending on three variables p, q, and r, for all k ≥ 0 and m ∈ {1, 2}.
Besides, we define the following auxiliary formulas:
for all i, j ≥ −1. The following lemma is describing the basic properties of the key formulas.
Lemma 3.5. For all i, j ≥ −1, k ≥ 1 and m ∈ {1, 2},
Proof. By induction on k ≥ 1. Without loss of generality, we can assume that m = 1. The basis of induction consists of two cases: k = 1 and k = 2. Induction base: k = 1. In this case we have
It can easily be checked that the following derivations holds in Int:
Conversely, since the formulas
and therefore the following derivations holds in Int:
Induction base: k = 2. In this case we have
Furthermore, it follows easily that:
Induction step is straightforward and left to the reader. The lemma is proved.
Encoding of the Minsky machine
Now we encode instructions of the Minsky machine M as superintuitionistic formulas such that derivations from Int and these formulas are simulate transformations of M.
First, let us define the following formulas containing only tree variables p, q, r:
where s ≥ 0, i, j ≥ 1. By Lemma 3.5, we have the following evident lemma. Lemma 3.6. For all s, m, n ≥ 0,
Now we prove that if the Kripke frame F refutesÊ s,i,j for s, i, j ≥ 0 then it refutesÊ s,i,j at a point e [s,m,n] for some m ≥ ϕ(i), n ≥ ϕ(j) such that α 0
Lemma 3.7. Given a world w of a Kripke model
Proof. If w |=Ê s,i,j , then there is a point w ′ ≥ R w such that the formulas A 
, therefore w f , w g are incomparable points. 
Since |i ′ − j ′ | < 2, it can easily be checked that i ′ = j ′ = l and i ′′ = j ′′ = l + 1 for some l ≥ 0. Induction step: k > 2. Let the induction assumption be satisfied for all 2 ≤ k ′ < k, then there are a points w f ≥ R f 
Reduction of configuration problem
In this section formally reduce the configuration problem of the Minsky machine M to the derivation problem of the superintuitionistic propositional calculus Int + Ax(M).
Conclusion and further research
In this paper, we established that there is an undecidable superintuitionistic propositional calculus using axioms in only 3 variables. Since there is no an undecidable superintuitionistic propositional calculus with axioms containing less than 3 variables, therefore a natural and interesting question is there a superintuitionistic propositional formula A containing less than 3 variables for which the superintuitionistic propositional calculus Int + A is undecidable. In this respect, we note that Sobolev in 1977 [17] constructed a two-variable superintuitionistic propositional formulas B such that Int + B is not finitely approximable.
